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SPECIAL REPORT

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Summary

Haitian dictator Duvalier presently is in a stronger position than ever, largely because of the collapse of organized opposition to him following the critical period last April and May. He has been successful in remaining in power beyond his legal presidential term mainly through his understanding and exploitation of the weaknesses and eccentricities of the Haitian people. He has been careful to shift or remove regime officials before they could build up personal followings against him, and most of the small number of top officials who have retained their posts throughout his administration are extreme opportunists, including some Communists and pro-Communists. It is from this group of persons that a successor to Duvalier would be most likely to emerge as matters now stand. The chances that a bloodbath and a general breakdown of central authority would result from Duvalier's removal from the presidency are considered high.

The Haitian Army, traditionally the kingmaker in local politics, has been transformed by repeated purges from the most likely agent of Duvalier's downfall into one of three armed groups supporting him and responsive to his dictates. The civil militia and a secret police organization--both created by Duvalier originally to counter the power of the army--complete the roster of the forces maintaining him in power. Army efficiency and capabilities have declined as US-trained officers have been removed or have fled into exile, while the discipline and degree of training of the militia appear to have increased. Some form of unification of the two forces may be carried out in the future.

The Communist threat in Haiti, heretofore considered negligible because of communism's lack of appeal among the country's politically inert masses, is increasing. Haiti's Communists presently lack militancy but are permitted to operate relatively unchecked by the regime and consequently are increasing their strength. The danger of a seizure of power by a small, determined Communist elite group in the event of Duvalier's removal is clearly mounting.

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On the other hand, the threat posed by Haiti's limited ties with the bloc appears to be minor compared with the internal threat at this time. Haiti has few contacts with the bloc or with Castro's Cuba, and there appears to be little evidence of political or subversive interest in Haiti on the part of Communist-controlled countries.

Haiti's economic deterioration probably has been accelerated under Duvalier. An economic collapse, however, does not appear imminent, since a bumper coffee crop later this year is expected to alleviate the country's present foreign exchange shortage. A grandiose "economic development plan" announced by Duvalier on 22 May appears, like a previous "self-development" program, to have been devised for internal political reasons. It holds little promise of accomplishing anything, but may be used by the regime to attempt to coax and extort additional funds from domestic and foreign sources.

Haitian opposition to Duvalier is characterized at present by the despair and inactivity of the dictator's opponents within Haiti and by the weakness and fragmentation of exile groups. The death of Clement Barbot on 14 July virtually ends organized resistance to Duvalier within Haiti, and Haitian exile groups now active in the Dominican Republic appear to be dissipating most of their energies in attempting to discredit each other rather than building strength against Duvalier. Exile disintegration is being accelerated by Dominican President Bosch's sudden decision to refuse permission for the use of Dominican territory by the exiles for training and staging purposes.

Annex A: Basic Facts On Haiti

Annex B: Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings



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Duvalier's Political Situation

Haitian dictator Duvalier has emerged from the turbulent period of April and May in a stronger position than ever. There appears to be no organized group within the country or abroad that is now in a position to attack him, let alone topple his regime. The relatively small segment of the population in Haiti which is sufficiently active politically to carry any weight in opposing him has been cowed and demoralized by the failure of this spring's attempts against him and by the regime's subsequent imposition of even tighter measures of control and repression.

The impetus behind the drive to oust Duvalier on or before 15 May--the date his legal term of office expired--has been entirely dissipated. There are no prospects for another psychologically propitious period for a drive against his regime for some time to come. He claims that the term to which he was "re-elected" in 1961 is to run for six years, but several domestic groups already have urged "spontaneously" that he be "president for life." In this situation, the most likely possibilities for his removal appear to have narrowed down to two: his death from assassination or from natural causes (the 55-year-old Duvalier's health is and has been uncertain), or a coup staged by one or more of his trusted associates.

Duvalier has managed to maintain his regime largely by building up a body of loyal henchmen to act as the instruments of his policy of terrorism and repression, and by effectively playing off and neutralizing those individuals who might at some time oppose him. He has instituted a pervasive, effective informant system to apprise him of plots well before they can materialize. Beyond this, he has perhaps succeeded in prolonging his term of office where other Haitian presidents have failed because he thoroughly understands and has cunningly used the weaknesses and eccentricities

PRESIDENT DUVALIER

of the Haitian temperament to his own advantage. To the apolitical, superstitious masses, he is "Papa Doc," the virtual personification of a Voodoo god; to the country's overwhelmingly Negro population, he has shown himself to be anti-mulatto and a devotee of black supremacy, which he calls "negritude"; to all Haitians, he poses as a Haitian nationalist, frequently invoking past glories and the names of famous national heroes such as Emperor Dessalines.

One aspect of his exploitation of nationalism has been seen in his use of the US as a scapegoat for virtually all the ills that beset the country. He has consistently charged that American miserliness, not Haitian mismanagement and corruption, is the basic reason for Haiti's continuing economic and social deterioration. In recent weeks, anti-US pronouncements by regime leaders have taken on a different tone; they have asserted that the US was responsible for the recent critical period and for the abortive attempts against Duvalier which then took place. These charges appear to have culminated--at least for the present--in the ousting of the US naval and air force missions and the refusal of the Haitian Government to allow US Ambassador Thurston to return to Haiti. Duvalier has been careful not to press his attacks on the US too far; he may still hope to regain some sort of US economic aid commitment, and he may believe that the risks attendant upon a complete break with the US are too great to be taken.

Few regime officials are permitted by Duvalier to exercise real power, and those who do are largely of the same stripe as the dictator himself. Most top officials are sporadically reshuffled or removed in order to prevent their building up a personal following which might some day challenge Duvalier. Several of the men who have occupied cabinet-level positions longest under Duvalier are Communists or pro-Communists. Pro-Communist Minister of Finance Herve Boyer allegedly is a former member of the French Communist Party. The same report has been received on Jules Blanchet, who is currently serving as Haiti's ambassador to the European Common Market. Minister of Commerce Clovis Desinor is frequently reported to be at least pro-Communist, although some reports classify him as an extreme opportunist. Others fitting into the latter category are Minister of Public Works Luckner Cambronne and Jacques Fourcand, the director of the social security institute. Both the latter are top Duvalier aides and confidants. Adrien Raymond, who holds the number two position in the Foreign Ministry, is another individual who evidently has Duvalier's confidence and whose authority appeared to increase during the recent crisis. He and his brother, Colonel Claude Raymond --quartermaster general of the Haitian Army--are tough, trusted

allies of the dictator, but both are said to have strong personal ambitions to rule Haiti if Duvalier were to fall.

Any of these officials is ambitious enough to attempt individually or in collusion with others to assume control of the government. All are so intimately linked with the present regime that as a potential successor to Duvalier, each would be nearly as objectionable to all concerned as Duvalier himself. Most of the officials listed above have been reported at one time or another to be plotting to remove Duvalier. A variant on this theme has been the report of a plan whereby Duvalier would resign and leave the country after arranging for several of his close advisers to assume power. None of these reports so far has been considered reliable, but of the two alternatives described, the former course would appear in the light of Haitian history to be more likely to materialize than the latter. At any rate, it is from the small clique now surrounding Duvalier that a successor, in the event of the dictator's removal, would most likely be drawn. The constitutional successor to the presidency is the president of the country's highest court; the present incumbent of this office, Adrien Douyon, is a Duvalier devotee who, like all other regime officials, is a sycophantic supporter of Duvalier. He is believed not to be strong enough to survive on his own.

Duvalier's sudden removal from office could bring about a bloodbath which might quickly lead to general chaos and anarchy unless strong outside forces were brought in. There have been several reports that Duvalier has prepared lists of persons to be slaughtered, and has instructed his followers to loot and burn in the event of an attempt on his life. If such an attempt were successful, a controlled slaughter could rapidly get out of hand as word spread of the dictator's demise. The longer Duvalier retains power, the greater will be the populace's list of grievances against his henchmen and the sharper their desire to exact revenge.

The Haitian Armed Forces

The failure of a military-led coup attempt on 10 April 1963 and the consequences thereof have virtually destroyed the capability of the Haitian armed forces (FAd'H) to overthrow Duvalier. The Haitian Army in particular has been transformed from the most likely agent for accomplishing Duvalier's ouster into one of three armed groups protecting him in his efforts to perpetuate himself in power.

Traditionally the FAd'H has made and unmade Haitian presidents. Duvalier, however, in order to counter this threat against him, has virtually remodeled the FAd'H in his own image. Whereas Duvalier in the past has looked on the FAd'H

as the most likely source of an attempt to overthrow him, he now considers it one of the groups which solidly supports his regime. He has been able to achieve this complete about-face by systematically eliminating all officers whom he regarded as not completely subservient to him. Since his inauguration in 1957, Duvalier has cashiered approximately 191 officers (49 percent of the officer corps), the last purge of about 60 officers having taken place in the 20-23 April period.

The officers purged from the FAd'H have been the older, more experienced and stable elements of the armed forces. For the most part they were US-trained, pro-US and competent. In their place, Duvalier has placed political appointees (many former enlisted men) who offer little in military qualifications but are politically acceptable and loyal to his regime. The effectiveness of the armed forces has been reduced to the point that it has minimal value as an organized military force.

The Ton Ton Macoutes (Duvalier's secret police) were established in late 1957 by Clement Barbot, who later turned against the regime and recently headed, until his death on 14 July, the sole known organization opposing Duvalier within Haiti. The TTMs are a loosely organized mixture of military, paramilitary and civilian activist supporters of the regime. Their mission is to keep Duvalier and Haiti's blacks in absolute power as long as possible. Ostensibly a presidential bodyguard, they are Duvalier's confidential agents, dealing in terrorism and violence. Composed mostly of thugs and other undesirables, the TTMs number from 1,000 to 1,500, are expert in brutality and the techniques of political repression, and serve the regime while serving themselves.

The civil militia is a part-time paramilitary force. Even though it has been in existence since 1958, it was not legalized until November 1962 when it was officially designated the "National Security Volunteer Corps" (VSN). The VSN represents a politically mobilized and ideologically oriented force which keeps the masses in line. Formed, according to Duvalier, for internal security and to ensure against an external invasion, it was actually established to offset the strength of the FAd'H. The VSN has the potential to identify and report clandestine opposition to Duvalier anywhere in Haiti; it has been used successfully to turn out the vote for Duvalier and to suppress minor political disturbances. There are about 10,000 militiamen, of which only about 25 percent are equipped with firearms. Some 2,500 militiamen are concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area alone. The VSN operates as an adjunct of the Ton Ton Macoutes and is used to implement TTM orders

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when the number of men needed is fairly large. [redacted] in Port-au-Prince, some 6,700 members of the VSN took part in the 22 May parade celebrating the second anniversary of Duvalier's "re-inauguration." On the basis of its impressive appearance at this time, the VSN is believed to have received considerable training during the past year.

The US military missions in Haiti--which until their expulsion by Duvalier this spring maintained close relations with the officers of the FAd'H--were feared by Duvalier. He claimed that the missions "interfered" with the absolute personal loyalty which he demanded of his officers. As of now the opportunities for such "interference" have been greatly reduced; FAd'H officers and men have been virturally barred from the slightest contact with those US MAAG personnel still remaining in the country. Duvalier continues, however, to give evidence of his fear of such contacts by hampering any and all efforts by the MAAG group to accomplish its normal functions.

The chances of a military coup occurring in the foreseeable future appear quite small. It is more likely that the militia will become better organized, trained and equipped as the army's capabilities and standards continue to deteriorate. An eventual merger of the two groups could occur when Duvalier considers that his present drive to convert the armed forces into a more useful tool of his regime has been accomplished. Such a force probably would not be worthy of consideration as a military organization by non-Haitian standards, but would be powerful enough to suppress quickly any internal move against Duvalier that might develop.

The Communist Threat

The threat of communism in Haiti has traditionally been regarded as small, largely because the Haitian populace is generally apathetic, illiterate, and apolitical. Also, the pressures for land reform which have been exploited to such advantage by Communists in other Latin American countries are largely non-existent in Haiti; the Haitian peasants have owned their own tiny plots of land for generations. Haiti's abject poverty, its appalling social conditions, and its political bankruptcy, however, do create a situation which readily lends itself to Communist exploitation. While the docile, lethargic nature of the population probably would preclude the possibility of a Communist takeover through a mass uprising, it would facilitate the control of the country by a small, dedicated Communist elite group if it were to seize power.

The evidence now available indicates that such a dedicated, hard-core Communist organization is being built up within Haiti. While the effectiveness and militancy of local Communists are believed to be rather low

at this time, their potential is clearly increasing. This results in no small degree from Duvalier's policy of tolerating --for his own devious political purposes--the existence of Haiti's two Communist parties, both of which are permitted to function almost unhindered despite their clandestine status. These organizations are the People's Unity Party (PEP), which is estimated to have roughly 500 members, and the People's National Liberation Party (PPLN), with an estimated membership of up to 1,500 persons. The PEP has well-established international Communist connections and is recognized as the official Communist party by the international Communist apparatus. It is concentrating on building well-trained and disciplined cadres; the PPLN is less tightly knit and is more of a mass party. The PPLN publishes a small periodical pamphlet which appears irregularly entitled Haiti Demain (Haiti Tomorrow).

Both the PEP and the PPLN are steadily gaining new members. Duvalier's removal could lead to an acceleratied growth particularly if a new government were formed by those elements of the pro-Communist or opportunist stripe who now surround the dictator. If Duvalier's downfall were to result in chaos and a breakdown in national authority, only the Communists, who are the only organized opposition forces in Haiti, would be in a position to gain influence and power.

External Communist attention to Haiti appears to be of minor importance compared with the potential threat posed by domestic forces at this time. Poland is the bloc nation most active in Haiti and is the only one maintaining diplomatic ties with the Duvalier regime. A Polish commercial attaché has resided in Port-au-Prince since April 1962. Warsaw's new ambassador to Mexico, who is resident there but accredited as minister to several Middle American countries, presented his ministerial credentials to Haitian officials last month. Recent information reveals a growing Polish commercial interest in Haiti and indicates that Duvalier probably is encouraging still more interest on Poland's part. Several Polish trade officials have visited Haiti since April, and as of 26 June a Polish-Haitian commercial firm [redacted] was being established in Port-au-Prince to promote barter deals between the two countries. The first barter contract set up by the firm is said to envisage an exchange of Haitian coffee and other products for 17,000 tons of Polish cement and other products, with a total value of $300,000.

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Czechoslovakia also has evinced commercial interest in Haiti, but evidently to a lesser extent. A six-man Czech trade delegation visited Haiti in early March of this year and met informally with Haitian businessmen. There was no indication that the delegation met with any Haitian officials, and no important deals for cash or barter were made. [redacted] since mid-1962

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that Czech weapons have come into Haiti, but none have been confirmed.

Firmer indications of the extent of bloc interest in Haiti may develop shortly. A Haitian cabinet-level delegation is tentatively scheduled to leave for Western Europe in September to seek economic aid commitments from France, West Germany, and Italy. If these attempts to acquire Western economic aid should fail--and preliminary indications are that only minor aid offers will be made at this time --Haiti reportedly will seek Czech and Polish help.

Duvalier has threatened on a number of occasions over the past several years to turn to the bloc for economic assistance if he could not obtain more aid from the US. For the most part, these threats--the latest of which was implied in Duvalier's 22 May remark that Haiti might be forced to turn to "other systems" if satisfactory economic support were not forthcoming from within the free enterprise system--have been implied rather than explicit and have not been followed up. A few tenuous feelers by Duvalier toward the bloc [redacted] that former Haitian foreign minister Raymond Moyse headed a small delegation sent to Moscow in a quest of Soviet aid during the summer of 1962. Such overtures as may have been made evidently have met with little response from the bloc. There also have been few other indications of any bloc interest in Haiti; bloc propaganda media have rarely mentioned Haiti, and except for the unfavorable comments on Duvalier made by Moscow and the Soviet delegation at the UN during the Haitian-Dominican crisis, bloc commentary on Haiti has been largely noncommittal.

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[redacted] several Communist and pro-Communist members of Duvalier's coterie were plotting to remove him from power and subsequently declare Haiti to be a "socialist republic [redacted] during the several weeks preceding the end of Duvalier's legal term of office on 15 May; [redacted] there is some reason to believe that these reports were deliberately planted by Duvalier so that they might reach US Government officials. Nevertheless, if such a course of action were ever implemented, the chances of such a successor government eliciting bloc or Cuban support would appear considerably greater than are the prospects of the present government. Even in this case, however, the bloc's initial reaction to an appeal for support probably would be cautious until the situation was clarified and the nature and extent of US reaction had become apparent. Also, the bloc might be cautious unless the neighboring Dominican Republic--a more attractive and more significant target for eventual bloc domination--were won over first.

There is no evidence of more than a perfunctory interest

in Haiti on the part of the Castro regime at this time. Cuban-Haitian relations were broken in August 1959 following an abortive "invasion" attempt against Haiti by a handful of Castro's followers, and contacts between the two nations have been minimal ever since. Several Haitian Communists reportedly live in Cuba, and one of them, Rene Depestre, is said to have been given a job by Castro at the Cuban Government printing office in Havana. Radio Havana devotes an hour each day to beaming a broadcast in the Creole language to Haiti; the broadcast was initiated late last December following an 18-month lapse in Cuba's international broadcasts to Haiti. Aside from this, there is little evidence of Cuban interest.

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[redacted] in early May, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa remarked that Cuba had its own troubles and was interested neither in Duvalier nor in Dominican President Juan Bosch, who were described as "equally distasteful" to the Cuban Government.

There have been several reports recently that Castro is training thousands of Haitians and French-speaking Africans to be used in a take-over of Haiti and that some of these forces have already been infiltrated into Haiti. Neither aspect of these reports can be confirmed.

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[redacted]

there are approximately 80,000 Haitians living in Cuba, most of them having emigrated there as cane-cutters in the pre-Castro period. [redacted] only a small percentage of these persons are Castro supporters and [redacted] no evidence of Africans being trained to go to Haiti. [redacted] the Haitians who had gone to Cuba found living conditions there superior to those they had left behind, which would incline most of them to remain. Sources familar with the Haitian people point out that clandestine entry into the country, even for native Haitians, would be no easy task; such persons would quickly be spotted by local authorities, who tend to be suspicious of any "strangers." There is no evidence that such incidents have occurred.

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The State of the Haitian Economy

Haiti remains an overcrowded and impoverished country where the levels of production, income, health, and literacy are probably the lowest in the Western Hemisphere and among the lowest in the world. The major problems facing the economy are those which have plagued the country for generations: inadequate natural resources, low agricultural productivity, a lack of diversification in production, and a lack of any systematic economic development program and trained personnel to implement economic reforms. Agricultural production--the country's main economic activity --is retarded by the prevalence

of subsistence farming on small family plots and by the owners' failure to observe even the most elementary principles of land and soil conservation. Haiti's major exports are coffee, sugar, and sisal. Coffee, the most important crop, grows wild and receives a minimum of processing from the peasants who collect it. Continued heavy dependence on coffee, with alternating high and low crop years and continuous price fluctuations, results in periodic strains on the country's economic stability.

Under Duvalier, the country's over-all economic deterioration has continued unchecked. Revenues ostensibly raised for developmental purposes have been diverted for Duvalier's personal use and that of his top officials and armed retainers. Taxes have been increased as much as the traffic will bear, and foreign businesses in Haiti are incessantly asked to "contribute" to the regime's coffers. The level of business activity has declined and during the last six months business has been especially poor due to the effects of a longshoremen's strike in the US, the political situation in Haiti, and the virtual cessation of the tourist trade--formerly Haiti's second-largest source of foreign exchange.

Many observers who have been struck by the poverty and economic stagnation so evident in the country have assumed that an economic collapse is imminent. Such a collapse now appears extremely unlikely, since the country grows enough food to satisfy the regime's needs and since the coffee crop to be harvested during this October and November is expected to be a good one. This will bring the regime much-needed foreign exchange and relieve temporarily much of the economic pressure built up over the past year. Also Haiti remains fiscally sound in the technical sense. The economy, however dreary it may be in other respects, has had a notably good record in fiscal-monetary performance ever since the end of the US occupation of the country in 1934.

In his speech of 22 May, President Duvalier announced the initiation of an elaborate new economic and social development plan for the country which he titled the "Plan of Urgency." Basically the "plan" calls for a $50-million investment annually for two years, in order to put the nation's economy on the road to progress. The announced goal of the plan is a five-percent increase in the nation's per capita GNP, to be achieved at the rate of 2.5 percent per annum. After the first two years of operation, the plan calls for an annual investment of $70 million, the extra $20 million going toward meeting the costs of maintenance and replacement.

Typically, however, the plan contains no specific provision for financing, aside from vague references to "national effort" and "sacrifice," and a rather blustering assertion that foreign aid with strings attached will

not be accepted. The plan evidently assumes that the means will somehow and somewhere be found; aside from this, Duvalier referred to the program as "an alliance with ourselves for progress." The economy clearly cannot produce the funds necessary to finance a program of this magnitude, and it is doubtful that in its present state the Haitian economy could absorb an investment of $50 million, even if it became available. The scheme appears similar in purpose to Duvalier's earlier "National Renovation Movement," an economic development project of smaller scope which has served Duvalier's domestic propaganda purposes and whose major accomplishment has been the partial construction of a low-cost workers' residential community named "Duvalierville" in an area where there is little need of it. For these reasons the plan has not been taken very seriously in Port-au-Prince except for its implied threat of increased taxation.

Duvalier's Opposition

The strength of Duvalier's position today comes not only from his own clever manipulation of the forces which have the potential to overthrow him, but also from the extreme disarray and despair of those Haitians who oppose him. The Haitian opposition has long been deeply fragmented, but only recently have the anti-Duvalier forces--particularly those remaining within Haiti--lost hope of overthrowing the dictatorship. With the passing of the 22 May anniversary celebrations of Duvalier's "reinauguration" in 1961, the anti-Duvalier momentum built up during the preceding two months evaporated, and despondency supplanted optimism in opposition circles.

Recent reports from within Haiti indicate that silent, inactive opposition to Duvalier among politically conscious sectors of the population continues at a high level and probably has increased. They also make it clear that the populace has been cowed by the regime's repressive power and by its often-demonstrated brutality against known or suspected dissidents. Most of those Haitians who have exhibited courage or capability in the struggle against Duvalier have either been killed or imprisoned by the regime, or have taken asylum in foreign embassies and have fled to other countries. Only Clement Barbot--whose death was announced by the regime on 14 July--and his handful of followers actively opposed Duvalier from within Haiti in recent months. Barbot's death may well leave Duvalier virtually unopposed at home at this time; the capabilities of the surviving remnants of his group are believed to be quite limited.

Such internal opposition to the regime as exists is centered mainly in the small Haitian mulatto element, which has been especially persecuted by Duvalier since he took power. He has been largely successful in destroying

the political power of the mulattoes, who traditionally have controlled most of the country's key posts other than the presidency. Further, Duvalier has sharpened historical racial antagonisms between them and the country's Negro masses--the latter accounting for approximately 95 percent of the population. There are reports that in the event of an attack on his regime, Duvalier's henchmen have standing orders to launch an all-out attack on the mulattoes. Many members of this group already have been liquidated or have fled into exile, but those who remain--businessmen, intellectuals, and professionals who have not been harmed because of their economic importance to the country--are bitterly opposed to Duvalier.

The exile picture is one of fragmentation and confusion. A multitude of small, personalistic exile groups exist, but most of them tend to focus more on attempting to discredit rival groups and personalities than on directing efforts against the Duvalier regime. (See Annex B for a brief description of some of the exile organizations most frequently reported on.) Most of the groups have advanced dubious claims of substantial support within Haiti, and few have come up with detailed plans for a future government. Many are limited in their appeal to other Haitians because their leadership is composed of Haitian politicans of the old-school type who, if they were to achieve power, would probably ape the present regime in most of its authoritarian and corrupt practices. Few are believed to have much financial support or military resources available at this time.

Concentrations of anti-Duvalier exiles are located in the Dominican Republic; in New York and Miami in the US; and in Cuba, Venezuela, and the Bahamas. There are lesser numbers in other areas. The center of Haitian exile activity is the Dominican Republic. To Haitian exiles hoping to build up strength for an eventual conquest of their homeland, the Dominican Republic is both a natural and an important staging area. Given their present lack of financial and military resources, the Haitian exiles would be hard pressed to mount any kind of an attack on Duvalier without active Dominican support.

Dominican President Juan Bosch's recent loud protestations of his opposition to Duvalier have historical antecedents: Haitian-Dominican relations have been characterized by tension and strife ever since 1822. In 1937 the two countries nearly went to war after thousands of Haitian canecutters who had crossed the border to work in Dominican canefields were slaughtered by the Trujillo dictatorship. Now difficulties between the two countries have been revived largely because of the conflicting natures of their governments. Bosch, a member of the

political school of the democratic left, like Costa Rican ex-president Jose Figueres and Venezuelan President Betancourt, opposes everything which Duvalier stands for and has said that their two governments cannot exist for long on the same island: one will have to fall. The Haitian-Dominican crisis which erupted in late April was a reflection of this sentiment. It was largely manufactured by Bosch, who used the crisis to rally the Dominican people to an old banner in order to divert their attention from domestic political and economic problems.

Most of the larger Haitian exile organizations have vied, with some success until recently, for Dominican support for a move against Duvalier. Bosch now opposes providing military equipment and training sites to any of the exiles, although several groups did receive such aid earlier. His about-face in this matter may have sprung from his fear of international censure and from his unfavorable impressions of the Haitian exiles he has met. His decision, however, has served to accelerate the confusion and disintegration of the Haitian exile forces. The Dominican Government is nevertheless continuing to welcome Haitian exiles into the country, and hundreds of refugees and exiles have crossed the border into the Dominican Republic in recent months. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

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ANNEX A

Basic Facts on Haiti

Capital City:	Port-au-Prince Pop. (1963 est.) 200,000
Area	10,714 square miles
Population	4,400,000 (1963 est.)
Rural to Urban Ratio:	85% to 15%
Illiteracy:	90% (est.)
Budget	$28,800,000 (1 Oct 62 to 30 Sept 63)
Percentage of Budget for Military:	26%
Total Value of Exports:	$32,000,000 (1961 est.)
Total Value of Imports:	$35,000,000 (1961 est.)
Chief Exports (1962-63):	Coffee - 40% Sugar - 16% Sisal - 10%
US Investment (Direct):	$70,000,000
Per Capita GNP:	$65-$70 (est.)
Armed Forces (FAd'H):	Army - 4,788 Coast Guard - 314 Aviation Corps - 184
Civil Militia (VSN):	10,000 (1963 est.)
Ton Ton Macoutes:	1,000-1,500 (1963 est.)
US Aid to Haiti since World War II:	$100,000,000
US Aid to Haiti under Duvalier Regime:	$50,000,000

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ANNEX B

Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings*

(Listed alphabetically)

1. Corvington military grouping:

Ex-colonel Paul Corvington, former director of Haiti's military academy who left the country as an asylee this spring and who is distinguished by his capable military leadership as well as by his distrust of Haitian exile politicians, is attempting to build an organization of other former military officers and men for an eventual attack on Duvalier. Active mainly in the Dominican Republic, Corvington and a few associates have negotiated with Dominican President Bosch and elements of the military leadership there for their support, but the Corvington group is not believed to be receiving such assistance at this time. A Haitian priest, Father Jean Baptiste Georges, currently appears to be working closely with Corvington.

2. Dejoie-Fignole Haitian "Government-in-Exile:"

Two former rivals for the Haitian presidency in the 1957 elections, Louis Dejoie and Daniel Fignole, announced on 12 May their joint leadership of a 16-man provisional "government-in-exile." Their organization appears never to have gone beyond the planning stage and the two leaders have split up, according to recent reports. Dejoie, a wealthy mulatto of conservative political tendencies, has attempted several times since 1957 to oust Duvalier, and claims a large number of supporters within Haiti. Fignole, who actually was president of Haiti for 19 days in June 1957, is a spellbinding Negro orator and demagogue who is believed to retain a considerable following among Port-au-Prince's slum dwellers. Both Dejoie and Fignole are presumably continuing their attempts to build their own organizations.

*Within the Haitian exile concentrations, alliances between groups and their leaders shift constantly and rapidly as the key figures jockey for increased prestige and support. For this reason, certain generalizations as to the makeup of the groups and their alliances with other organizations listed herein may very quickly become less than accurate.

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3. FRU (United Revolutionary Force):

The prominence of the FRU has declined rapidly since mid-May, when the organization's military training camp just across the Haitian border in the Dominican Republic was closed down by the Bosch government. The group, estimated in May to have a strength of about 60 men, was set up by Haitian exile brothers Jacques and Raymond Cassagnol and was indirectly financed by Haitian ex-President Paul Magloire. The FRU camp was disbanded and its equipment seized by the Dominican Government apparently only hours before it was to launch an invasion effort against Duvalier. Other exile groups within the Dominican Republic reportedly have been vying for the allegiance of the FRU members, but no one group seems to have absorbed them.

4. MJH (Young Haiti Movement):

This well-organized and active group is led by a Haitian Catholic priest, Father Gerard Bissainthe, who is of leftist persuasion. His group reportedly includes elements both of the democratic left and of the extreme left. Father Bissainthe claims that MJH groups have been organized in several Haitian exile centers, including New York, Caracas, and Puerto Rico, and asserts that the organization has about 500 members within Haiti. Most of the group's current efforts are centered in the Dominican Republic. The MJH formerly received its military guidance from André Riviere, a self-proclaimed French guerrilla warfare expert who recently was ousted from the group.

5. MPH (Haitian Patriotic Movement):

Founded in 1962, the MPH is led by Clement Benoit and is centered in Nassau, B.W.I. Benoit has put forward greatly exaggerated claims as to the strength of his organization, which is believed small and probably has little financial or any other support. Benoit himself is generally regarded as a rather minor figure on the Haitian exile scene who is trying to build up his own importance.

6. PNH (National Haitian Party):

The political vehicle established by the late Clement Jumelle (an unsuccessful presidential candidate who competed against Duvalier in the 1957 elections), the PNH today is politically quiet and is nominally led by Clement's brother, Gaston Jumelle. The organization has maintained its original philosophy, which is of the moderate left, and its present headquarters is believed to be in New York. Some of Haiti's most progressive, enlightened, and

professional people maintain loose ties with the PNH, but these people--one group of whom is referred to as the Latortue group, stemming from the name of one its members, Francois Latortue--are handicapped in their political efforts by the lack of any real organization. The PNH and the Latortue group are believed to enjoy considerable support among intellectuals in Haiti.

7. UDN (National Democratic Union):

The UDN is the older of the two amalgamations of several Haitian exile groups, the other being the Dejoie-Fignole organization. It was formed in 1962 by a "traditional" Haitian politician, Pierre Rigaud, who heads the group's main concentration in the Dominican Republic. The UDN is also represented in New York, Washington, and Caracas. It contains groups of various political persuasions and includes representatives of at least two of the groups listed above (PHN and MPH). Its military leader at present reportedly is General Leon Cantave, a competent, pro-US former Haitian army chief of staff. The group may have greater numerical strength than any of the others. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~